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in an attempt to prevent a so-called heckler’s veto. This Essay examines the
tension between providing a public platform for controversial speakers and
the costs associated with doing so, including the relevance of the Supreme
Court’s aging incitement test created in Brandenburg v. Ohio. It also
questions the Court’s 1992 ruling in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement
restricting governmental entities’ ability to shift escalating security fees to
speakers based on fears of violence.
AUTHOR—Clay Calvert, Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass
Communication and Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment
Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987,
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The
author thanks Hannah Beatty, Gabriel Diaz, Jessie Goodman and Jayde
Shulman of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project for their
careful review of early drafts of this Essay.

109

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 110
I. BRANDENBURG MISSES THE MARK: PREEMPTIVE STRIKES, PRIOR RESTRAINTS
AND PREDICTING VIOLENCE ........................................................................ 118
II. SHOULD TINKER APPLY WHEN DIVISIVE SPEAKERS VISIT CAMPUS?
ELEVATING A HIGH SCHOOL STANDARD TO THE COLLEGIATE LEVEL.......... 121
III. THE HECKLER’S VETO AND SHIFTING SECURITY COSTS: PAYING A HIGH COST
FOR LOW-VALUE SPEECH ............................................................................ 123
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 129

INTRODUCTION
Here’s a foolproof formula for generating legal woes at public
universities:
Start with a healthy dose of the First Amendment.1 It protects offensive
ideas,2 including on campus.3 Then sprinkle in ignorance among many
students regarding the types of expression—most significantly, hate
speech4—that the First Amendment safeguards.5
Stir into this mixture a “safe spaces”6 mentality at some institutions
where, purportedly, “professors live in fear of accidentally offending their
1

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and
Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press . . . are among
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
2
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (calling it “a bedrock First Amendment principle”
that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend”).
3
See Papish v. Bd. of Curators Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (asserting that “the mere
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university campus may not be
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency’”); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
4
Justice Samuel Alito recently explained for the Supreme Court that hate speech is protected by the
First Amendment, writing that “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal, 137 S. Ct. at
1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
5
A nationwide survey of 1,500 undergraduates conducted in August 2017 found that 44% mistakenly
believe the First Amendment does not protect hate speech and 16% did not know if the First Amendment
protects hate speech. John Villasenor, Views Among College Students Regarding the First Amendment:
Results from a New Survey, B ROOKINGS I NST . (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
fixgov/2017/09/18/views-among-college-students-regarding-the-first-amendment-results-from-a-newsurvey/ [https://perma.cc/RH5X-WRGV]; see also Catherine Rampell, Students Need a Lesson on Free
Speech, W ASH . P OST , Sept. 19, 2017, at A17 (noting that the same survey revealed “significant
differences by gender: Women are more likely than men to believe hate speech is not constitutionally
protected (49 percent vs. 38 percent, respectively)”).
6
The definition of safe space is contested. Stanford University Education Professor Eamonn Callan
notes, for example, that while the meaning of safe space “is ambiguous,” the term “sometimes means an
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own students.”7 This seemingly contravenes the United States Supreme
Court’s pronouncement more than four decades ago that universities are
robust marketplaces of ideas.8 Indeed, as Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea
recently wrote, “Public colleges and universities are struggling more than
ever to balance their obligations under the First Amendment and their desire
to create inclusive communities.”9
Next, toss into this already volatile mélange several divisive, potstirring provocateur speakers. Most prominent among them are former
Breitbart News editor Milo Yiannopoulos10 and self-identified white

institution that has been rid of all speech that offend any oppressed group, or perhaps anyone at all.”
Eamonn Callan, Re: The Thought Police, S TANFORD M AG ., Sept. 2017, at 34, 34. Other definitions exist.
See generally Sophie Downes, A Misleading Attack on Trigger Warnings, N.Y. T IMES , Sept. 11, 2016,
at Sunday Review 4 (“A safe space is an area on campus where students—especially but not limited to
those who have endured trauma or feel marginalized—can feel comfortable talking about their
experiences. This might be the Office of Multicultural Student Affairs or it could be Hillel House, but in
essence, it’s a place for support and community.”); Stephanie Saul, Campus 101: Learning How Not to
Offend, N.Y. T IMES , Sept. 7, 2016, at A1 (defining safe spaces as locations “where students from
marginalized groups can gather to discuss their experiences”); Margaret Sullivan, Talk of Free Speech
Mired by Sessions’s Hypocrisy, W ASH . P OST , Sept. 27, 2017, at C2 (discussing safe spaces as areas
“provided by universities to protect students from ideas that upset them”).
7
Bret Stephens, Our Best University President, N.Y. T IMES , Oct. 21, 2017, at A21.
8
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (opining that “[t]he college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents State
Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). The marketplace of ideas is “one of the most powerful images
of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for laypersons.” MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE
SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). The
theory hinges on the assumption that free speech “contributes to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove,
The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998
(2003).
9
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 M INN . L. R EV . 1801,
1804 (2017). See also E RWIN C HEMERINSKY & H OWARD G ILLMAN , F REE S PEECH ON C AMPUS 1
(2017) (“Where should we draw the line between protecting free speech on college campuses and
protecting an inclusive learning environment? Hardly a week goes by without new tensions around this
question.”).
10
See Joseph Bernstein, Here’s How Breitbart and Milo Smuggled Nazi and White Nationalist Ideas
into the Mainstream, B UZZ F EED N EWS (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/josephbernstein/
heres-how-breitbart-and-milo-smuggled-white-nationalism?utm_term=.atKe0Ngak#.aimrEVo8B
[https://perma.cc/9AR5-W3CE] (“The Breitbart employee closest to the alt-right was Milo Yiannopoulos,
the site’s former tech editor known best for his outrageous public provocations, such as last year’s
Dangerous Faggot speaking tour and September’s canceled Free Speech Week in Berkeley.”); William
Cummings, Video Leads Milo Yiannopoulos to Resign from Breitbart News, USA T ODAY , Feb. 22, 2017,
at 3A (“Milo Yiannopoulos resigned from Breitbart News, the far-right website where he was a top editor,
after video surfaced in which the controversial figure appeared to condone sex with boys as young as
13.”); Jacey Fortin & Emily Cochrane, Citing Free Speech, A.C.L.U. Sues Washington Metro Over
Rejected Ads, N.Y. T IMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/us/politics/aclu-adsbanned-metro.html [https://perma.cc/AF83-A6HE] (labeling Yiannopoulus a “right-wing provocateur”);
Thomas Fuller, Berkeley Cancelation Won’t Deter Some Right-Wing Speakers, N.Y. T IMES , Sept. 24,
2017, at A16 (describing Yiannopoulus as a “writer and professional provocateur of liberal campuses”
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nationalist Richard Spencer.11 Their incendiary presence is being felt
precisely when many students feel their institutions “should be allowed to
establish policies that restrict slurs and other language that is intentionally
offensive to certain groups.”12 For example, a 2017 survey of 1,250
undergraduates conducted by YouGov revealed that “[a] majority of very
liberal students (63%) and almost half of very conservative students (45%)
agree that it is important to be part of a campus community where they are
not exposed to intolerant or offensive ideas.”13
Then throw in two violent incidents. The first, ironically, erupted at the
University of California, Berkeley—cradle of the Free Speech Movement.14
It stifled a February 2017 talk by Yiannopoulos.15 That mayhem, in turn, led
the institution to cancel “a planned event with conservative author Ann
Coulter.”16 The Young America’s Foundation and Berkeley College

whose February 2017 appearance at the University of California, Berkeley “was canceled when protesters
attacked the building where he was scheduled to speak”).
11
Spencer is “a prominent white nationalist.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, White
Nationalist Protest Leads to Deadly Violence, N.Y. T IMES , Aug. 13, 2017, at A1. He “is credited with
coining the term ‘alt-right.’” Kevin Roose, Digital Home for Alt-Right Pulls Away Welcome Mat, N.Y.
T IMES , Aug. 16, 2017, at B1. Spencer, who heads the “white-nationalist group National Policy Institute,”
also has been characterized as a “neo-Nazi.” Margaret Sullivan, To Fight Bigotry and Hate Speech, Don’t
Muzzle It, W ASH . P OST , Aug. 21, 2017, at C1. The Southern Poverty Law Center calls Spencer “one of
the country’s most successful young white nationalist leaders—suit-and-tie version of the white
supremacists of old, a kind of professional racist in khakis.” Richard Bertrand Spencer, S. POVERTY LAW
CTR.,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/richard-bertrand-spencer-0
[https://perma.cc/3QRN-FN5R] (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). See also Ashley May, Man at Center of UF
Frenzy Is Out to Change the World, USA T ODAY , Oct. 20, 2017, at 2A (reporting that “Spencer was born
in Boston and grew up in an affluent neighborhood of Dallas,” and noting that “[h]e graduated from the
University of Virginia in 2001 and got a master’s degree in humanities at the University of Chicago”).
12
K NIGHT F OUND . ET AL ., F REE E XPRESSION ON C AMPUS : A S URVEY OF U.S. C OLLEGE
S TUDENTS AND U.S A DULTS 12 (2016), https://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/
publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE8J-BWF7].
13
F OUND . FOR I NDIVIDUAL R IGHTS IN E DUC ., S PEAKING F REELY : W HAT S TUDENTS T HINK
A BOUT E XPRESSION AT A MERICAN C OLLEGES 3 (2017), https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/11091747/survey-2017-speaking-freely.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LMX-YDPN]
(emphasis added).
14
The Free Speech Movement (FSM) began in late 1964 when students at the University of
California, Berkeley sought to garner attention for the civil rights movement. They met resistance from
university officials who, “citing a formerly unenforced school regulation which prohibited campus
political advocacy, told students they could not raise money or distribute literature on campus for the civil
rights movement or any other off-campus political cause.” Robby Cohen, Berkeley Free Speech
Movement: Paving the Way for Campus Activism, 1 O RG . A M . H ISTORIANS M AG . H IST . 16, 16 (1985).
Ultimately, the “FSM’s success demonstrated to students across the nation that effective protest
movements could be built on campus, and that engaging in such dissident activity was not ‘un-American’
but was, in fact, their moral and political right.” Id. at 18. See generally T HE F REE S PEECH M OVEMENT :
R EFLECTIONS ON B ERKELEY IN THE 1960 S (Robert Cohen & Reginald E. Zelnik eds., 2002) (featuring
chapters by multiple authors, including Mario Savio, a leader of the movement).
15
Thomas Fuller, A Free Speech Battle at the Birthplace of a Movement, N.Y. T IMES , Feb. 3, 2017,
at A9; Susan Svrluga, Berkeley Cancels Speech by Breitbart Writer Milo Amid Intense Protests, W ASH .
P OST , Feb. 2, 2017, at A2.
16
Benjamin Oreskes & Paige St. John, Free Speech at What Cost?, L.A. T IMES , Aug. 30, 2017, at
B1.
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Republicans in April 2017 sued multiple University of California officials
over such censorship.17
The second occurrence was a deadly altercation in the hometown of the
University of Virginia: Charlottesville. It arose between neo-Nazis and
counterprotestors, including anti-fascists (colloquially, antifa) sometimes
accused of violence,18 in August 2017.19 Richard Spencer was present and
scheduled to speak in Charlottesville the day chaos broke out over the
removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee20 and the presence
of “a rally of white nationalists.”21
The “Unite the Right” gathering attracted about 500 to 600 participants
from more than thirty states.22 Spencer, however, holds “his followers
blameless in the Charlottesville melee.”23 He asserts that “[t]he idea that I
could be held responsible is absurd.”24
Finally, bake this combustible, cacophonous concoction in an oven: 1)
overheated by a politically polarized climate;25 2) stoked by a U.S. Attorney
17

Verified Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory, and Monetary Relief, Young America’s Found. v.
Napolitano, No. 3:17-cv-02255 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017).
18
See Michael E. Miller, Antifa: Fascism Fighters or Lawless Thrill-Seekers?, W ASH . P OST , Sept.
15, 2017, at A17 (reporting that antifa activists “are all open to using violence, some embrace it—even
glorify it,” and adding that “[i]n Washington, a masked antifa sucker-punched Richard Spencer”).
19
See generally Joe Heim, Ellie Silverman, T. Rees Shapiro & Emma Brown, Charlottesville Protest
Takes a Deadly Turn, W ASH . P OST , Aug. 13, 2017, at A1 (“Chaos and violence turned to tragedy
Saturday as hundreds of white nationalists, neo-Nazis and Ku Klux Klan members . . . clashed with
counterprotesters in the streets and a car plowed into crowds, leaving one person dead and 19 others
injured.”); Matt Pearce, David S. Cloud & Robert Armengol, Chaos in Charlottesville, L.A. T IMES (Aug.
13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-charlottesville-white-nationalists-rally20170812-story.html [https://perma.cc/M2Y3-FBXB] (reporting on “a violence-filled Saturday in
Charlottesville, Va., where white nationalists had gathered for one of their largest rallies in at least a
decade, only to see their event end in chaos and national controversy,” and adding that “[b]loody street
brawls broke out between dozens of anti-racism activists and far-right attendees, many of whom carried
shields, weapons and Nazi and Confederate battle flags.”).
20
Stolberg & Rosenthal, supra note 11, at A1.
21
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hurt and Angry, Charlottesville Tries to Regroup, N.Y. T IMES , Aug. 14,
2017, at A1.
22
Spencer S. Hsu, Study: Rally in Charlottesville Drew from Far and Wide, W ASH . P OST , (Oct. 9,
2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/08/charlottesville-white-supremacist-rally-attendees-35states/ [https://perma.cc/UP82-6PKW].
23
Arelis R. Hernández, Jack Gillum, Michael E. Miller & Steve Hendrix, No Bail for Suspect;
Portrait Emerges of a Violent Teen, W ASH . P OST , Aug. 15, 2017, at A4.
24
Leonard Greene, Racist Alt-Right Feeds off President Trump’s Rhetoric, N.Y. D AILY N EWS (Aug.
13, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/racist-alt-right-feeds-president-trump-rhetoricarticle-1.3408936 [https://perma.cc/836G-DQ7B].
25
See generally Rick Hampson, Few Swearings-In Stir Tension; But Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, Nixon
Faced Hostility in Taking Office, D AYTON D AILY N EWS , Jan. 21, 2017, at Z3 (describing President
Donald J. Trump’s inauguration as “possibly the most politically polarized Inauguration Day since the
Civil War”); Jesse Wegman, After 58 Years, a ‘Stranger’ Says Goodbye to the Supreme Court, N.Y.
T IMES , July 3, 2017, at A16 (noting that the United States today is “a politically polarized society”).
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General who asserts that “[f]reedom of thought and speech on the American
campus are under attack;”26 and 3) punctuated by verbal gusts of searing air
from President Donald J. Trump. Trump, who is prone to spout off on Twitter
in blunt, button-pushing fashion about nearly everything,27 “occasionally
trafficked in retweets of racist social media posts during his campaign.”28 He
responded to the Charlottesville violence, however, “in what critics in both
parties saw as muted, equivocal terms.”29 Indeed, Trump insisted there were
“very fine people, on both sides”30 of the Virginia fracas.
What’s the end result of this convergence of factors and forces? At least
four federal lawsuits,31 as well as multiple threatened ones,32 targeting public
universities and their ability—or lack thereof—to deny Richard Spencer

26

Sari Horwitz, Debbie Truong & Sarah Larimer, Sessions Criticizes Free-Speech Policies, W ASH .
P OST , Sept. 27, 2017, at B1 (quoting the remarks of U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions during a speech
at Georgetown University Law Center).
27
See generally Brian Fung, Twitter Defends Its Stance on Trump, W ASH . P OST , Sept. 27, 2017, at
A18 (addressing “a controversial tweet by President Trump . . . that targeted North Korea,” and noting
“repeated calls from some users that the president’s account be banned”); Katie Rogers & Maggie
Haberman, Like Father Like Son, Using Twitter as a Foil to Skewer Political Foes, N.Y. T IMES , July 1,
2017, at A14 (describing President Trump’s “affection for Twitter as a weapon against political foes,”
and adding that “President Trump tends to fire a digital bazooka when met with a perceived slight, often
hitting below the belt and leaving himself open to bipartisan criticism”).
28
Jonathan Lemire, Trump Names Hate Groups, Denouncing Charlottesville Violence, S T . L OUIS
P OST -D ISPATCH , Aug. 15, 2017, at A1.
29
Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Critics Slam Trump’s Tepid Condemnation of Violence on
‘Many Sides’ in Virginia, N.Y. T IMES , Aug. 13, 2017, at 14. See Amy B. Wang, One Group Loved
Trump’s Remarks About Charlottesville: White Supremacists, W ASH . P OST (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/13/one-group-loved-trumps-remarksabout-charlottesville-white-supremacists/ [https://perma.cc/457R-5LEE] (“President Donald Trump’s
public remarks on the violence in Charlottesville, Va., have been criticized by many, including members
of his own political party, for being insufficient and vague.”).
30
Denis Slattery & Christopher Brennan, Be Nice to Nazis, N.Y. D AILY N EWS , Aug. 16, 2017, at
News 4.
31
See Complaint, Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-cv-00231-WKW-WC (M.D. Ala. Apr. 18,
2017); Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, Padgett v. Bd. of Trustees Mich. State Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00805
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Michigan State Complaint]; Plaintiff Cameron Padgett’s Verified
Complaint, Padgett v. Bd. of Trustees Ohio State Univ., No. 2:17-cv-00919-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio Oct.
22, 2017) [hereinafter Ohio State Complaint]; Plaintiff’s Complaint, Padgett v. Bd. of Trustees Pa. State
Univ., No. 4:17-cv-01911-MWB (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Penn State Complaint].
32
See ASSOCIATED PRESS, White Nationalist Threatens to Sue Two Ohio Universities if Speech
Rejected, D AYTON D AILY N EWS , Oct. 1, 2017, at B5 (involving threats by attorney Kyle Bristow to sue
the University of Cincinnati and Ohio State University if those institutions deny Richard Spencer access
to speak on campus); Claire McNeill, White Nationalist’s Lawyer Puts UF on Notice, T AMPA B AY
T IMES , Sept. 1, 2017, at 1 (describing First Amendment attorney Gary Edinger’s battle against the
University of Florida to allow Richard Spencer to speak on the Gainesville campus, and reporting that
“Edinger sent university officials a formal notice . . . giving them one more chance to let Spencer speak—
or UF will be taken to federal court”).
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access to speak on campus.33 All of the cases are filed by Cameron Padgett,
“who is helping to organize Spencer’s college tour.”34
As one newspaper article tidily encapsulated the underpinnings of this
litigious situation:
The rally in Charlottesville left universities across the U.S. bracing for more
clashes between extremists and the protesters who oppose them. It also left
schools in an increasingly tight bind as they try to ensure campus safety in the
face of recruiting efforts by white nationalist and neo-Nazi groups that have
escalated beyond campus fliers and online messages, and to balance that with
freedom of speech.35

For example, in announcing Pennsylvania State University’s denial of
access to Spencer to talk at the University Park campus, Penn State President
Eric Barron explained that a potential Spencer visit “presents a major
security risk to students, faculty, staff and visitors to campus.”36 Barron
elaborated that “[i]t is the likelihood of disruption and violence, not the
content, however odious, that drives our decision.”37 Cameron Padgett
ultimately sued Penn State in October 2017.38 The complaint alleges Penn
State and Barron “wantonly violated Plaintiff’s right to free speech as
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution by prohibiting Plaintiff from hosting Richard Spencer . . . of the
National Policy Institute . . . as a speaker on the campus of Pennsylvania
State University.”39
Barron’s sentiment mirrors University of Florida President Kent
Fuchs’s explanation in August 2017 for why his institution initially denied
Spencer access. “The likelihood of violence and potential injury—not the
words or ideas—has caused us to take this action,” Fuchs asserted.40 A
University of Florida spokesperson cited the violence in Charlottesville as

33

See infra Part I (addressing whether the test from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
provides public universities with power to preemptively ban Spencer from stepping foot on campus to
speak).
34
Susan Svrluga, Richard Spencer’s Upcoming Speech at U-Fla. Sparks Worries About Safety,
W ASH . P OST , Oct. 10, 2017, at A03.
35
Collin Binkley & Michael Kunzelman, Charlottesville Exposes New Threat for College Campuses,
S T . L OUIS P OST -D ISPATCH , Aug. 21, 2017, at A11.
36
Ramsey Touchberry, Penn State is 5th University to Deny White Nationalist Richard Spencer,
D AYTON D AILY N EWS , Aug. 27, 2017, at B8.
37
Id.
38
Bill Schackner, Penn State Faces Suit for Snubbing ‘Alt-Right’ Speaker; Richard Spencer a
Security Risk, University Said, P ITT . P OST -G AZETTE , Oct. 21, 2017, at A1.
39
Penn State Complaint, supra note 31, at 2.
40
Claire McNeill, UF Denies Stage for Hate Speech, T AMPA B AY T IMES , Aug. 17, 2017, at 1.
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justifying this decision,41 although the university later allowed Spencer on
campus on October 19, 2017.42 Similarly, when Michigan State University
rebuffed Spencer, it released a statement contending the “decision was made
due to significant concerns about public safety in the wake of the tragic
violence in Charlottesville.”43
In brief, Charlottesville proved a game-changing force for universities
across the nation in justifying decisions to deny access to Richard Spencer.44
As University of California, Berkeley Chancellor Carol Christ cogently put
it, “What happened in Charlottesville—I’m very concerned that could
happen again. The political situation has shifted in ways that some extremist
groups of the right and the left feel authorized to [use that] kind of
extraordinary violence.”45
The theory that past violence in Charlottesville justifies censoring
future speech on other campuses raises a crucial constitutional issue.
Specifically, is the Supreme Court’s test for determining when speech
constitutes unlawful incitement unprotected by the First Amendment
adequate for addressing this situation? In other words, does the standard from
Brandenburg v. Ohio46—today’s version of the clear-and-present-danger
test47—permit what amount to preemptive strikes banning speakers based on
the past bad acts associated with them? This Essay argues it does not.
A second related question is whether college administrators should be
allowed to invoke the test from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
41

Id.
Susan Svrluga, Richard Spencer Gets OK to Speak at the University of Florida, His First Campus
Event Since U-Va., W ASH . P OST (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/
2017/10/05/richard-spencer-gets-ok-to-speak-at-the-university-of-florida-his-first-campus-event-sinceu-va/?utm_term=.df78afaf52f9 [https://perma.cc/DT5M-MEGW].
43
David Jesse, Group Decries Antifa’s ‘Heckler’s Veto,’ USA T ODAY , Sept. 5, 2017, at 6B.
44
See Joseph Goldstein, ‘Agonizing’ at A.C.L.U. Over the Rise of Violence in Political Protests,
N.Y. T IMES , Oct. 5, 2017, at A19 (“Since Charlottesville, public universities in at least six states have
rebuffed attempts to bring the alt-right ideologue, Richard Spencer, to campus, citing the risk of
violence.”).
45
Susan Svrluga & Sarah Larimer, ‘We Don’t Pretend This Is Over’: After Charlottesville, Colleges
Expect Trouble, W ASH . P OST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/wedont-pretend-this-is-over-after-charlottesville-colleges-expect-trouble/2017/08/29/2d07de3e-884711e7-a50f-e0d4e6ec070a_story.html?utm_term=.6deb1052f5d5 [https://perma.cc/EL5D-88R2].
46
395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court in Brandenburg held that “the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.” Id. at 447.
47
The clear-and-present danger test was created in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In
Schenck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Id. at 52. See also Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An “Accidental,” “Too Easy,” and
“Incomplete” Landmark Case, 38 C AP . U. L. R EV . 517, 520 (2010) (noting that “Brandenburg is famous
for abandoning the ‘clear and present danger’ test”); Steven M. Morrison, The System of Modern Criminal
Conspiracy, 63 C ATH . U. L. R EV . 371, 389 (2014) (“The ‘clear and present danger’ test gradually
evolved into the Brandenburg test, which the Court set forth in the 1969 case of the same name.”).
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Community School District48 to thwart the likes of Spencer from stepping
foot on campus. The Tinker standard permits public schools, from high
school to elementary,49 to stop student speech if officials have actual facts to
reasonably forecast that the speech will cause a substantial and material
disruption of schoolwork or discipline.50 This Essay contends that while the
Tinker test is much better suited than Brandenburg to block speakers based
on past bad actions, its deployment in colleges is misguided and could
dangerously lead to public universities treating students like high school
pupils.
Third and finally, the Essay reconsiders the heckler’s veto principle
and, specifically, the extremely high security costs that institutions such as
the University of Florida—more than $500,000 in its case with Spencer51—
must bear when inflammatory individuals come on campus. The cost for
police security at the University of California, Berkeley when Yiannopoulos
spoke there in September 2017 was a whopping $800,000.52
The fact that public universities have picked up such exorbitant security
tabs is especially relevant because the Supreme Court twenty-five years ago
in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement53 struck down a local ordinance
that allowed “a government administrator to vary the fee for assembling or
48

393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
See K.A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 110 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that Tinker
“provides the requisite analytic framework for even an elementary school student’s speech or
expression”).
50
The Tinker majority opined that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.” 393 U.S. at 511. It added that conduct that “materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Id. at 513. The majority noted that an
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.” Id. at 508. It emphasized that “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” is not sufficient grounds for squelching student speech. Id.
at 509.
51
In a press release, parts of which were published by a local newspaper, the University of Florida
stated:
Since safety of students, faculty, staff and visitors to campus is the University’s top priority, UF
will end up paying at least $500,000 to enhance security on campus and in the city of Gainesville.
This includes costs from the University of Florida Police Department, Gainesville Police
Department, Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Florida
Highway Patrol and other agencies who are providing first responders.
Andrew Caplan, Richard Spencer’s Contract to Speak at UF Complete, G AINESVILLE S UN (Oct. 5, 2017,
8:58
PM),
http://www.gainesville.com/news/20171005/richard-spencers-contract-to-speak-at-ufcomplete [https://perma.cc/YE9E-28HZ].
52
Benjamin Oreskes & Javier Panzar, How the ‘Coachella of Conservatism’ Fizzled into an
‘Expensive Photo Opp’ at Berkeley, L.A. T IMES (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-milo-berkeley-antifa-20170925-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/4HLL-H7JE].
53
505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order.”54 Writing
for a five-justice majority, Justice Harry Blackmun reasoned that “[s]peech
cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”55 This Essay asks whether
shifting a reasonable portion of security costs to an antagonistic speaker with
a track record of violence is equivalent to a constitutionally impermissible
heckler’s veto. The Essay resolves that ratcheting up fees on a speaker is
unfair when, in fact, it is the audience that resorts to violence when
confronted by First Amendment-protected expression.
Finally, this Essay concludes by calling on public university leaders to
find the courage—and the money—to protect the speech rights of extremists
rather than to roll back the First Amendment freedom of speech.56 To
sacrifice the First Amendment in the face of Richard Spencer is to accord
him far more power and influence than he and his viewpoints are due.
I.

BRANDENBURG MISSES THE MARK: PREEMPTIVE STRIKES, PRIOR
RESTRAINTS AND PREDICTING VIOLENCE

Incitement to violence is one of the very few categories of speech not
protected by the First Amendment.57 An unlawful incitement occurs under
Brandenburg v. Ohio58 when three elements are satisfied: “(1) intent
(embodied in the requirement that such speech be ‘directed to inciting or
producing’ lawless action); (2) imminence (embodied in the phrase
‘imminent lawless action’); and (3) likelihood (embodied in the phrase ‘and
is likely to incite or produce such action’).”59
The Brandenburg Court also stressed the key difference between
protected abstract advocacy of violence and unprotected speech involving
“‘preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.’”60 It
added that “[s]tatutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on
freedom of speech, must observe the established distinctions between mere
advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action.”61
The Brandenburg test is highly relevant when attempting to prevent
Richard Spencer from speaking on campus. Consider, for example, how
54

Id. at 124.
Id. at 134–35.
56
Infra notes 139–55 and accompanying text.
57
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (noting that “advocacy intended, and likely,
to incite imminent lawless action” is among the few categories of “content-based restrictions on speech
[that] have been permitted”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom
of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”) (emphasis added).
58
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Brandenburg test).
59
Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort
Cases?, 27 N. K Y . L. R EV . 1, 10 (2000) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
60
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (1969) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961)).
61
Id. at 449 n.4.
55
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closely snippets from an August 22, 2017, statement by Pennsylvania State
University President Eric Barron track key elements of the Brandenburg
standard:
• “[T]he First Amendment does not require our University to risk
imminent violence.”62
• “It is the likelihood of disruption and violence . . . that drives our
decision.”63
Indeed, in issuing a preliminary injunction in favor of Spencer’s right
to speak at Auburn University in April 2017—several months before the
violence at Charlottesville—U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins applied
the Brandenburg test.64 Watkins concluded that “Auburn did not produce
evidence that Mr. Spencer’s speech is likely to incite or produce imminent
lawless action.”65 In fact, the judge suggested Auburn had engaged in a
heckler’s veto, opining that Auburn “cancelled the speech based on its belief
that listeners and protest groups opposed to Mr. Spencer’s ideology would
react to the content of his speech by engaging in protests that could cause
violence or property damage.”66
That ruling, as noted above, occurred before the Charlottesville
incident. Does the subsequent violence there necessarily change this
Brandenburg calculus today when Spencer applies to speak on a public
university campus? Interestingly, the Brandenburg Court did not apply its
own test to the facts of the case; instead, it merely struck down an Ohio
statute, under which Clarence Brandenburg was prosecuted and convicted.67
Yet, the facts themselves suggest the test was intended to apply to this type
of situation.
Specifically, Brandenburg pivoted on a speech at an Ohio farm by Ku
Klux Klan leader Clarence Brandenburg that accompanied a cross burning
attended by about a dozen hooded Klan members, “some of whom carried
firearms.”68 Other than one television journalist who filmed the event, no one
else was present.69 Brandenburg hurled aspersions at both African Americans
62

Press Release, Pennsylvania State University, Richard Spencer is Not Welcome to Speak at Penn
State (Aug. 22, 2017), http://news.psu.edu/story/478590/2017/08/22/administration/richard-spencer-notwelcome-speak-penn-state [https://perma.cc/JD3P-DNLC] (emphasis added).
63
Id. (emphasis added).
64
Preliminary Injunction at 2, Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-cv-231-WKW (M.D. Ala. Apr. 18,
2017).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 2–3.
67
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (“Measured by this test, Ohio’s Criminal
Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained.”).
68
Id. at 445.
69
Id. at 445–46.
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and Jews.70 He also told his comrades, “We’re not a revengent [sic]
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might
have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.”71
Because no one else was nearby to hear such vitriol—just a dozen
Klansmen and a reporter—it seems clear these words were not likely to
produce the type of imminent lawless action that the Brandenburg test
demands. Furthermore, Clarence Brandenburg couched his language in
conditional terms rather than stating an immediate directive. Specifically,
any “revengeance” was only “possible” and simply “might” be needed “if”
government officials continued to suppress whites.72 The Supreme Court in
Hess v. Indiana, in applying Brandenburg, clarified that “advocacy of illegal
action at some indefinite future time”73 does not render it outside the bounds
of First Amendment protection.
Does the Brandenburg test allow courts to take into account prior
violence associated with a speaker in order to preemptively ban him from
speaking on campus? More specifically, would it permit a judge, in the
process of evaluating a public university’s decision to deny Richard Spencer
access to campus, to consider the violence in Charlottesville, assuming for
the sake of argument that such violence was directly caused74 by Spencer?75
The answer, arguably, is no.
That’s because the Brandenburg test is built for stopping speech in
progress, not for banning future expression. That is a crucial dichotomy.
Brandenburg is triggered only when an individual actually starts to speak. In
other words, a necessary condition to apply the standard is speech by the
individual in question. Without words, there simply is no advocacy to
proscribe. There is simply a person and a guess about what he might say.
In brief, a preemptive strike against Richard Spencer—banning him
from campus before he has a chance to start spewing his disquieting
beliefs—is impermissible under Brandenburg and amounts to a prior
restraint on speech.76 Prior restraints on speech, the Supreme Court has
70

Among other messages, Brandenburg stated things such as “bury the niggers,” “nigger will have
to fight for every inch he gets from now on,” and “send the Jews back to Israel.” Id. at 446 n.1.
71
Id. at 446.
72
Id.
73
414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
74
The Supreme Court recently has stressed that in order to permissibly regulate speech based upon
the nature of its content, “[t]here must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the
injury to be prevented.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012). See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (holding unconstitutional a California statute restricting minors’ access
to violent video games, and noting that California “cannot show a direct causal link between violent video
games and harm to minors”).
75
As noted earlier, Spencer asserts he did not cause the violence in Charlottesville. Supra notes 23–
24 and accompanying text.
76
Prior restraints on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and the government carries a heavy
burden in justifying such restrictions on speech. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971).

120

112:109 (2018)

Reconsidering Incitement, Tinker and the Heckler’s Veto

observed, “are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights.”77
To trigger Brandenburg, an individual must begin to talk. At that point,
an examination of the words uttered, in light of the entire context in which
they are used—including whether those same words spawned violence in the
past—should be undertaken to determine if they could be squelched.
Unfortunately, as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky laments, Brandenburg fails to
“answer . . . how imminence and likelihood are to be appraised.”78 This
ambiguity, in turn, is problematic when it comes to judges using past bad
actions that are causally attributable to a potential on-campus speaker to
forecast whether the speaker’s words are likely to spark imminent violence.
In summary, Brandenburg does not seem to allow a public university
to preemptively ban a controversial speaker from coming to campus. Such a
ban is tantamount to a prior restraint on expression. Instead, the speaker must
be afforded the opportunity to begin to speak and then, only at that point, is
a Brandenburg analysis undertaken.
It thus is time for the Supreme Court to revisit and revise Brandenburg.
Specifically, the Court should make clear precisely how much, if at all, any
prior acts of violence causally linked to an individual’s words during other
speaking appearances should be factored into the Brandenburg calculus.
Law enforcement officers who provide security at public university events
like a Richard Spencer speech have an extremely difficult job. Not only must
they provide physical security, but they need to know the weight they
permissibly can give to prior incidents of violence when deciding, under
Brandenburg, if speech is likely to incite imminent violence. It is the police
on the sidewalks, not judges in their chambers, who need to make snap, but
sophisticated, judgments affecting First Amendment rights. Without clarity
from the nation’s high court, the difficulty for law enforcement officers in
making those judgments is compounded.
II. SHOULD TINKER APPLY WHEN DIVISIVE SPEAKERS VISIT CAMPUS?
ELEVATING A HIGH SCHOOL STANDARD TO THE COLLEGIATE LEVEL
If Brandenburg cannot be deployed to prevent a prospective speaker
from talking on campus, is there an alternative legal mechanism a university
might assert to ban such an individual? One possibility is the Supreme

77
78

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
E RWIN C HEMERINSKY , C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW : P RINCIPLES AND P OLICIES 1049 (5th ed.

2015).
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Court’s substantial-and-material disruption test developed in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District79 nearly fifty years ago.80
The Tinker test permits schools to censor speech—and, by extension,
speakers—based on past misconduct. For example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2014 applied Tinker to uphold a school
district’s ban on the wearing of American-flag emblazoned and embossed
clothing on Cinco de Mayo, due partly to prior racial trouble on campus.81
Similarly, prior racial unrest permits school officials, under Tinker, to ban
the wearing of Confederate battle flag clothing.82
Tinker, however, involved two high school students and one junior high
school student, not censorship on a university campus.83 As Professor James
Hefferan wrote in 2016, “It must always be remembered that Tinker arose in
a primary and secondary educational context. The Supreme Court has never
expressly extended Tinker to speech occurring on college campuses.”84
The problem, of course, is that if public universities are successfully
able to assert Tinker to stop the speech of outside speakers such as Richard
Spencer, then it opens the door for public universities to apply Tinker to
censor the expression of their own students. In fact, as Frank LoMonte
writes, “lower courts at times rely on Tinker . . . as the starting point for
analyzing content-based restrictions on speech at public universities.”85
Writing elsewhere, LoMonte points out that although “some courts maintain
that Tinker is insufficiently protective at the college level,”86 “most circuits
79

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (setting forth the Tinker test).
81
See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1700 (2015) (noting that the censorship of the clothing in 2010 “took place in the shadow of
similar disruptions a year earlier”).
82
See, e.g., Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 334–35 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that “uncontested evidence
of racial violence, threats, and tensions” at two schools provided sufficient evidence, under Tinker, such
“school officials in this case reasonably forecast that permitting displays of the Confederate flag would
substantially disrupt or materially interfere with the school environment”); D.B. v. Lafon, 217 Fed. Appx.
518, 523–25 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a school’s “recent history of racial tensions as recited in the
record” allows it to prohibit, under Tinker, the wearing of Confederate battle flag apparel, and noting that
“[d]uring the prior academic year, Blount High School had been the scene of racial tension, intimidation
and violence to such an extent that law enforcement officials were brought in to maintain order, and the
school was defending against lawsuits depicting it as a racially hostile educational environment”); West
v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) (opining “that based upon
recent past events, Derby School District officials had reason to believe that a student’s display of the
Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights of other students to be secure and
let alone”) (emphasis added).
83
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (noting that the three petitioners were Des Moines, Iowa, high school
students John Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, as well as junior high school student Mary Beth Tinker).
84
James Hefferan, Picking Up the Flag? The University of Missouri Football Team and Whether
Intercollegiate Student-Athletes May Be Penalized for Exercising Their First Amendment Rights,
12 D E P AUL J. S PORTS L. & C ONTEMP . P ROBS . 44, 55 (2016).
85
Frank D. LoMonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can’t, and Shouldn’t, Control
Student Athletes’ Speech on Social Media, 9 J. B US . & T ECH . L. 1, 10 (2014).
86
Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered
Gates, 11 F IRST A MEND . L. R EV . 305, 311 (2013).
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have adopted Tinker as the starting point for analyzing censorship of college
students’ expression.”87 Indeed, Professors Vikram David Amar and Alan E.
Brownstein concur that “the analyses drawn from high school cases are often
used as starting points for courts confronting disputes in the university
setting.”88
This, unfortunately from a free-speech perspective, means reducing the
First Amendment rights of university students—“young adults,”89 as the
Supreme Court dubs them—to those of high school pupils by vesting
university officials with a test devised for high schools—Tinker—to
suffocate free expression. Therefore, Tinker should not be used by
universities as a tool to squelch speech, be it of either outside speakers or
students.
III. THE HECKLER’S VETO AND SHIFTING SECURITY COSTS: PAYING A
HIGH COST FOR LOW-VALUE SPEECH
A heckler’s veto occurs “when a crowd or audience’s reaction to a
speech or message is allowed to control and silence that speech.”90 This result
is anathema to the First Amendment freedom of expression because “the
censored ideas die aborning, and the marketplace of ideas is impoverished
accordingly.”91
Professor Brett Johnson recently explained:
After some time brewing in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s . . . the heckler’s veto
came to stand for the principle that state actors have a duty to protect speakers
from hostile audiences who would seek to either do harm to speakers, or
threaten to do harm and thereby force law enforcement to silence speakers.92

Although it is far from easy for the government to step up to the First
Amendment plate to defend speakers in such situations, doing so is vital. As
Johnson cogently wrote:
Hostile audience cases . . . become the supreme test of tolerance by state actors
toward extreme speech. Faced with the potential for popular disapproval of a
87

Id.
Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, A Close-Up, Modern Look at First Amendment
Academic Freedom Rights of Public College Students and Faculty, 101 M INN . L. R EV . 1943, 1944
(2017).
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Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981).
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D ON R. P EMBER & C LAY C ALVERT , M ASS M EDIA L AW 42 (19th ed. 2015).
91
Richard F. Duncan, Just Another Brick in the Wall: The Establishment Clause as a Heckler’s Veto,
18 T EX . R EV . L. & P OL . 255, 265 (2014).
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Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to
Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 175, 219
(2016).
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message to turn violent, state actors must refrain from acquiescing to the
popular will and protect the rights of speakers to share their unpopular message
rather than punish them for angering the audience. This principle reflects a deep
respect for the value of unpopular messages within American democracy.93

The burden, in short, is on the government to protect the speaker from
a heckler’s veto.94 As the Supreme Court wrote more than a half-century ago,
“Participants in an orderly demonstration in a public place are not
chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the
constitutionally protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react
with disorder or violence.”95
Robert Shibley, executive director of the Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education, observed in September 2017 that “it’s been a banner
year for hecklers,”96 as “colleges have allowed the heckler’s veto to
flourish.”97 But preventing a heckler’s veto on campus can come at an
immensely steep price today.
For instance, Richard Spencer’s October 2017 visit cost the University
of Florida and Sunshine State taxpayers more than $500,000 in security
costs.98 That sum covered costs not only for the university’s own police force,
“but also for the Gainesville Police Department, Alachua County Sheriff’s
Office, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Highway Patrol
and other agencies providing first responders.”99 By comparison, Spencer
paid a mere $3,870 for security within the Phillips Center—a theater with

93

Id. at 210–11.
See Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse,
35 H OFSTRA L. R EV . 1305, 1306 (2007) (observing that “the First Amendment grants a positive right to
the speaker: the local government must take action to protect the speaker against a hostile crowd. The
courts do not allow local law enforcement to accede to a heckler’s veto”).
95
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966) (emphasis added).
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Robert Shibley, Keep Students Safe from the Heckler’s Veto, WALL. ST. J, at A15 (Sept. 28, 2017).
97
Id.
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Claire McNeill, Holding Nose, UF Set for Visit, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/college/uf-security-costs-top-500000-for-richard-spencerstalk-on-white-separation/2340689 [http://perma.cc/JG96-JUUX] (“Yet the university, bound by the First
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UF, and taxpayers, of more than $500,000.”).
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Paige Fry, Speaker to Cost UF $500K for Security, PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 17, 2017),
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more than 1,700 seats100—at which he spoke.101 It was Spencer’s first visit to
a public university campus since the violence in Charlottesville.102
Why must universities foot the security bills rather than shift costs to
extremist speakers? Because forcing an individual to pay more in order to
speak safely is tantamount to a heckler’s veto: escalating costs make it
financially unfeasible to speak if foisted on the individual. In Forsyth County
v. Nationalist Movement,103 the Supreme Court reasoned that imposing
security costs based on the “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a contentneutral basis for regulation.”104 That’s a key point because content-neutral
regulations of speech typically are reviewed under a deferential, intermediate
scrutiny standard.105 In contrast, content-based restrictions are generally
subject to rigorous review under the strict scrutiny test.106 One might
100

See University of Florida Performing Arts Venues, UNIV. OF FLA. PERFORMING ARTS,
http://performingarts.ufl.edu/venues/ [https://perma.cc/B39R-A7VV] (last visited November 29, 2017)
(describing the Phillips Center as featuring “a 1700+ seat theater flanked by two reception foyers”).
101
McNeill, supra note 98. Spencer only had to pay for security costs inside the auditorium because
that is the only space he rented. He did not rent space outside the auditorium. Security fees inside the
facility, per UF’s standard rental agreement for the facility, cost $16.50 per worker-hour. Curtis M.
Phillips, M.D. Center for the Performing Arts Rental Information as of July 1, 2015, UNIV. OF FLA.
PERFORMING ARTS, http://performingarts.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/PCPA-Rental-PolicySummary-1-Page.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNY3-8MJ6] (last visited November 29, 2017). The University
of Florida explained why it had to pick up the tab for security outside the facility, posting the following
message on its website:
The application and assessment of security fees in the First Amendment context was litigated and
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992. The Court clarified that the government cannot assess
a security fee on the speaker based upon the costs of controlling the reaction of potential hostile
onlookers or protestors, under a legal doctrine called the “heckler’s veto.” As Justice Harry
Blackmun wrote for the Court in that case (Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement), “[s]peech
cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might
offend a hostile mob.” For UF, this means that Richard Spencer and his organization may not be
made responsible for paying the costs of potential protestors, onlookers, or members of the public
outside of the speaking venue.
Q & A for Richard Spencer 10/19 Event, UNIV. OF FLA., https://freespeech.ufl.edu/qa-for-1019-event/
[https://perma.cc/29MZ-JGJY] (last visited November 29, 2017).
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505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
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See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget
Malleable Doctrine, 13 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 131, 131–32 (2008) (asserting that the Supreme Court “has
devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral regulations (strict scrutiny for content-based
regulations, a more lenient intermediate scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)”); Minch
Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 123,
124 (2017) (“If the law only regulates the time, place or manner of speech, then the much more
government-friendly intermediate scrutiny standard is applied.”).
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See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (observing that “content-based
restrictions on speech” are permissible only “if they survive strict scrutiny,” and noting that strict scrutiny
requires a compelling government interest and a statute that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest);
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regulates speech based on
its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”).
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reasonably ask whether safeguarding students, staff, and faculty from threats
of violence constitutes a compelling interest107 sufficient to survive strict
scrutiny, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Justice Harry Blackmun opined for the Forsyth County majority that
while “raising revenue for police services” to protect marches and
demonstrations “undoubtedly is an important government responsibility, it
does not justify a content-based permit fee.”108 Tapping directly into the
notion of a heckler’s veto,109 the Nixon appointee emphasized that “[s]peech
cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”110 In brief, as the editors of
the Tampa Bay Times aptly opined the day before Richard Spencer spoke at
the University of Florida, “[t]his is the cost of democracy in action.”111
University of Florida President Kent Fuchs, however, explained the
real-world problems with this situation in the pages of the Wall Street
Journal shortly after Spencer’s visit to Gainesville.112 He wrote that “[a]t UF,
which had nearly 1,000 state and local law-enforcement officers on campus
on Thursday, the tab exceeded $600,000, the equivalent of nearly 100
students’ annual tuition. In effect, taxpayers heavily subsidized racist speech
rather than education or research.”113
In other words, forcing public universities to comply with Forsyth
County’s heckler’s veto principle in order to protect what many people
would likely consider low-value speech, rather than intellectual discourse, is
troubling. At the University of Florida, where Spencer’s National Policy
Institute controlled ticket distribution,114 his speech was “quickly drowned
out . . . by a hailstorm of chants, shouting and mockery.”115 It became more
spectacle and theater than education and information. Spencer called
audience members “shrieking and grunting morons,”116 while the crowd
chanted back, “Go home, racist, go home!”117
107
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It thus became a de facto heckler’s veto, but Spencer only had himself
to blame for permitting protestors into the auditorium where he spoke at UF.
After all, it was his own group—the National Policy Institute—that gave out
tickets to the event.118
Furthermore, the heckler’s veto principle merely protects a speaker
against violence, not against counterspeech in the form of verbal insults and
disruptions. As the Supreme Court of California observed in 1970,
“Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and
booing, even though they may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless
advance the goals of the First Amendment.”119 It added that First Amendment
protection for free speech cannot be confined to scenarios in “which the
audience must passively listen to a single point of view.”120 As Professor
Johnson encapsulates it:
It appears that as long as speech is met with peaceful speech and nothing
more—not fisticuffs or thrown rocks or bottles, not true threats or fighting
words or incitement to imminent lawless action—then law enforcement should
allow each side to compete against the other with words and other forms of
expression.121

Although $600,000 certainly proves that free speech, such as it was,
comes at a cost,122 it also raises serious concerns about just how much any
governmental entity can be forced to pay under the First Amendment.
Imagine, for instance, that multiple speakers of Richard Spencer’s ilk wanted
to speak at the University of Florida. If four such other individuals were each
118

See Noah Feldman, Richard Spencer Has Only Himself to Blame for Hecklers, B LOOMBERG
V IEW (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-19/richard-spencer-has-onlyhimself-to-blame-for-hecklers [https://perma.cc/S73E-TYA7] (noting that the hecklers “held tickets
distributed by Spencer’s own National Policy Institute”); Janae Muchmore, National Policy Institute
Takes over Ticket Distribution for Richard Spencer, WUFT (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.wuft.org/
news/2017/10/17/national-policy-institute-takes-over-ticket-distribution-for-richard-spencer/
[https://perma.cc/S8QZ-MQ9V] (describing how the National Policy Institute took over distribution of
all tickets after it “caught wind of local organizations and businesses intent to encourage locals to get
tickets and not show up”).
119
In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970).
120
Id.
121
Johnson, supra note 92, at 194.
122
Typically, the cost of free speech is felt in terms of the emotional or reputation harms that
individuals must endure, rather than the monetary expenditures necessary to safeguard expression.
Professor David Han explains:
Although First Amendment doctrine operates under the clear premise that unfettered speech is
valuable, it is equally clear that free speech comes at a cost. Speech can inflict significant harm on
others; it might, for example, persuade someone to commit violent acts, ruin a person’s reputation,
or directly inflict severe emotional distress. The First Amendment has practical meaning only
insofar as we are willing to absorb these sorts of speech-related harms to a greater extent than we
would with non-speech.
David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 W IS . L. R EV . 1135, 1141–42 (2015).

127

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

to rent space on campus and the same security measures were necessary to
prevent a heckler’s veto, then the institution would, in the aggregate, be
spending more than $2.5 million,123 a huge tab for a public university to pick
up. It is likely unsustainable for such an institution to continue to foot the bill
again and again.
In fact, the University of California, Berkeley in 2017 experienced such
a scenario. As a Los Angeles Times article explains, the university:
[I]ncurred at least $1.4 million in security costs since February, when
Yiannopoulos’ last appearance sparked violent protests. The campus spent
$200,000 on security for that event, $600,000 for [Ann] Coulter, whose event
ultimately didn’t happen, and an estimated $600,000 for the talk recently by
conservative writer Ben Shapiro, according to the university.124

On top of that, there was an additional estimated $800,000 in security
costs for Yiannopoulos’s September 2017 speech at Berkeley.125 All totaled,
that is more than $2 million in security costs.126 It is, as Professor Aaron
Hanlon pointed out, “a huge distraction for a university already struggling to
reduce a crippling budget deficit of $150 million.”127
In Forsyth County, the ordinance at issue allowed a local “government
administrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the
estimated cost of maintaining public order.”128 The problem, as Justice
Blackmun explained, was the utter absence of any established criteria or
defined variables by which the administrator could calculate costs.129 As
Blackmun encapsulated it:
There are no articulated standards either in the ordinance or in the county’s
established practice. The administrator is not required to rely on any objective
factors. He need not provide any explanation for his decision, and that decision
is unreviewable. Nothing in the law or its application prevents the official from
encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary
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application of fees. The First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such
unbridled discretion in a government official.130

Thus, if the problem in Forsyth County was what attorney Nathan
Kellum calls “the unconstitutionality of unfettered discretion,”131 then might
a more cabined and confined ordinance that provides clear and precisely
defined criteria shackling an administrator’s discretion pass constitutional
muster? In other words, does Forsyth County stand for a broad proposition—
“the government may not charge the speaker for the increased security
costs”132—or a narrow one under which security fees may be ratcheted up if
standards are established and applied that rein in government discretion? If
the latter is true, then public universities should establish explicit guidelines,
such as a set of four or five content-neutral criteria,133 to apply when
determining security costs that can be charged to a speaker.
The other alternative, of course, is to focus on the hostile audience and,
specifically, when groups that have caused violence in the past make it clear,
in advance of a controversial speaker’s appearance, that they intend to show
up to protest. To increase the costs on the speaker seems unjust when it is the
audience that engages in violence in response to First Amendment-protected
expression. As Professor Erica Goldberg points out, “Violent responses to
controversial speech are unfortunate, but penalizing speakers for the
misdeeds of their listeners is a far greater injustice.”134
CONCLUSION
The desire to ban controversial speakers from public university
campuses is anything but new. There were calls in 1970, for instance, to ban
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Yippie-founder135 Abbie Hoffman136 from speaking at the University of
Florida in Gainesville.137 But D. Burke Kibler, then-chair of the Board of
Regents and a staunch defender of “the rights of students preaching
revolution,”138 stood firm in welcoming Hoffman to campus while
simultaneously condemning him in the harshest of terms.
“I think it would be a sign of infinite weakness to resort to repression
as our defense against this scum. It would be rather chilling if our only
method of combatting this anarchist Marxist ideology was to repress it,”
Kibler averred.139 More than 2,000 people ultimately showed up at the
University of Florida’s Plaza of the Americas to hear Hoffman talk, and no
violence was reported.140 Kibler took ferocious flak for supporting free
speech rights, as did University of Florida President Kent Fuchs thirty-seven
years later for allowing Richard Spencer on campus.141 But presidents,
provosts, and professors at public universities today would do well to
remember and to find courage in Kibler’s strong First Amendment
commitment in the face of contentious speakers.142
Spencer, to either his enduring credit or blame, now pushes the
envelope of free expression on public college and university campuses to its
breaking point as he hopscotches across the nation to speak.143 The
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institutions, in turn, “are struggling to balance their mission of promoting
free speech and the exchange of ideas with their responsibility to keep
students safe.”144 As of late October 2017, three lawsuits were pending in
federal courts against major universities—Michigan State University,145
Ohio State University,146 and Pennsylvania State University147—that opted to
keep their students safe by denying Spencer on-campus access.
The legal questions regarding incitement that Spencer’s possible
appearances raise are virtually light-years removed from, in hindsight, the
relatively quaint issues spawned about forty-five years ago. That’s when a
public university-distributed newspaper daringly used the word
“motherfucker” in a headline and printed a cartoon “depicting policemen
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.”148 Some today might
invoke “motherfucker” to capture Spencer in all of his unresplendent and
unrepentant infamy. Yet, the alt-right leader proves once again that,
invariably and inevitably, the fringe elements of society demarcate the metes
and bounds of the First Amendment.
For example, it was members of the tiny, Kansas-based Westboro
Baptist Church (WBC) in Snyder v. Phelps who tested the scope of free
speech earlier this decade with their anti-gay, anti-military and anti-family
messages.149 Ruling in favor of the WBC in Snyder, Chief Justice John
Roberts engaged in dicta150 about the importance of free expression that
clearly resonates when it comes to safeguarding the words of Richard
Spencer:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we
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cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen
a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate.151

Although Spencer maintains he does not want violence,152 he is turning
government property—namely, public universities—into venues for possible
physical battles, not simply for wars of words. Spencer’s visit to the
University of Florida was pulled off without significant on-campus violence,
but that may be only because hundreds of law enforcement officers,
including rooftop snipers, staged an overwhelming show of force.153 One
must wonder whether militarization of a campus is the price the U.S.
Constitution requires for free speech and whether, in turn, the absence of
violence on campus at Florida will actually now help Spencer win his
lawsuits against Michigan State, Ohio State, and Penn State. Campus
militarization or otherwise, Richard Spencer’s speech at the University of
Florida represented, as one newspaper opined, “a legitimate, if utterly
repugnant, display of the First Amendment at work.”154
In putting the First Amendment to work, however, Spencer illustrates
problematic issues with Brandenburg’s incitement to violence standard and
the high price paid for free speech and preventing a heckler’s veto under
Forsyth County. But as Justice Louis Brandeis famously proclaimed ninety
years ago, “Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech
to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”155 Perhaps it is then simply
a cost of doing business—albeit, an exceedingly steep one—that public
universities and taxpayers bear for freeing their students, staff, and faculty
from the irrationality of believing, that in 2018, the Richard Spencers of the
world will force the diminution of free speech rights.
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